Until recently, Solana developers could hardly access the Fuzzy tool. Ether Lee has a mature fuzzy ecosystem, but Solana’s security test has been mainly composed of units test, integrated tests, and academic research tools that are not prepared for production.
Trident changes the yi by directly directing luxury smart contract purge technology, manually induced fujing (MGF) directly to the Solana program. This allows Solana developers to enjoy the best pursing methodology for security tests.
Discover the guide instead of the beast
Unit and integration tests provide a must -have protection but miss the complex edge case. Traditional black box pursing is an attempt to explore the overall state space through indiscriminate force, but the state space of the Solana program is too big to be completely searched.
The main problem is that the black box puzzle implements a heuristic to stop at any point or to guide the search. The two approaches miss important vulnerabilities.
MGFs can be followed by developers and security researchers instead of relying on algorithm heuristic.
- Target for known attack patterns By testing scenarios based on actual weakness research
- Simulate the attacker behavior Through the crafted educational sequence that reflects the actual exploit
- Focusing on the danger of each protocol Solve the unique attack surface of a given system
- Achieve a decision -making range -The important edge case will be tested.
This approach has been proven to be effective in our Ether Leeum security work and continued to discover vulnerability that other automated approaches and manual audits miss.
Solana requires a special fuzz test.
Solana’s execution model is different from EVM of Ethereum in main management. Unlike the Etherum Agreement, which maintains an internal storage, the Solana program is a stateless executable that works on an external account delivered in each transaction.
This separation enables solana parallel processing functions, but introduces certain types of vulnerabilities. Common pursing tools miss this unique attack vector.
Account -based national management
The Solana program must explicitly verify all the accounts provided in the transaction to create an opportunity for confusion attacks. The program can be assumed that the account is one of its own program derivative addresses when an attacker actually provides malicious substitutes.
Example vulnerability pattern:
// Vulnerable: No ownership verification
pub fn process_instruction(
program_id: &Pubkey,
accounts: &(AccountInfo),
instruction_data: &(u8),
) -> ProgramResult
let vault_account = &accounts(0); // Assumes this is the correct vault
// Process without verifying vault_account.owner == program_id
Black box fujing does not explain the expected account relationship, so these vulnerabilities cannot be systematically found. MGF defines a specific flow of a test account replacement scenario.
Parallel execution and race conditions
Solana’s offshore runtime runs transactions at the same time when it does not collide with an access account. Account locks from preventing default lace conditions, but subtle timing problems may arise, especially for multiple inspection transactions and cross programming calls (CPIs).
Cross programming call complexity
The Solana program often calls other programs through CPI to create a complex transaction flow. Single -user transactions can pack several instructions across different programs, and each potential can potentially call others again. This creates an attack surface by Solana, such as any CPI vulnerability that does not verify the target program ID.
Solara for MGF-specific attack vector
Account revival: Account closure and revival attack It occurs when the program closes the account by zeroing the lamports without proper indication. The attacker can return the Lamports to “resurrect” the account in the same deal.
MGF Flow Example:
# Flow 1: Close account (zeroes lamports)
def flow_close_account():
close_user_stake_account(attacker_account)
# Flow 2: Revive account (same transaction)
def flow_revive_account():
system_transfer(attacker, closed_account, 1_lamport)
# Flow 3: Exploit revived account
def flow_exploit_revived():
claim_rewards(closed_account) # Should fail but might succeed
# Invariant: Closed accounts should not be reusable
@invariant
def account_closure_invariant():
assert closed_accounts_are_not_exploitable()
Confirmation of missing signators: Fuzzdelsol study We have found this vulnerability class in numerous distributed programs where important tasks are carried out without proper signators.
Random CPI attack: A program that allows users to ID creates an attack vector through a malicious program that imitates the legitimate interface.
Vulnerable pattern:
// Dangerous: User-controlled program_id
invoke(
&token_instruction,
&(
user_provided_token_program.clone(), // Attacker controls this
source_account.clone(),
dest_account.clone(),
),
)?;
Solana fujing tool
Trident: The first fujing framework for the Solana program written in Rust
Trident 0.11.0 This is the main progress of Solana security test. Ether Lee has been manually informing Fuji for many years, but Solana developers lacked basic tooling for this advanced test approach. Trident provides the most sophisticated smart contract test technology directly to Solana’s execution model.
Tridents enable the systematic attack scenario configuration if the Black-Box Fuzzle relies on statistical sampling. This target approach already discovers the main vulnerabilities of the Solana protocol and shows the power of the guide discovery of indiscriminate personnel.
Reasons for using Trident:
- SVM enforcement execution: It has been optimized for Solana’s virtual machine performance
- Account model recognition: Understands Solana’s unique state management
- Integration of warm chain data: Activates tests on realistic blockchain conditions
- Cross programming interaction support: Processes complex CPI scenarios
- Properties and status fujing: CIndependent application range approach
Battle test for major protocols:
Trident has been verified through real implementation through major Solana projects.
- worm-hole: Cross Chain Bridge Infrastructure Test
- A domain that cannot be stopped: Distributed domain security validation
- Fireplace finance: Defi protocol vulnerability search
These distribution shows the function of Trident, which allows financial losses to handle seriously complex production rating protocols with financial losses.
Alternative tool: Mollusk Lightweight SVM runs for high -performance scenarios. Custom integration uses an RPC interface, but sacrifices commercial performance benefits in the process.
Implementation strategy
1. Preferences setting
First, set the test environment using Solana toolchain, anchor framework and selected fuzzing tools.
Trident Integration:
cargo install trident-cli
trident init your-project2.. Immutable implementation
immutability After a series of operations, it is always a property that must be maintained. They are climaxing that is confirmed after each flow execution.
Impression definition that captures the required security properties:
- Preservation method (token balance, reserves)
- Access control requirements
- Consistency in the overall account
- Account ownership confirmation
- Status consistency test
3. Flow definition
no way flow It represents a single test step in order. Think of a single transaction or guideline call within a larger attack scenario. The flow allows you to model the actual attack pattern by chaining certain guidelines together.
Identify important command sequences based on program functions and known vulnerability patterns. It focuses on multi -pilot transactions that can expose racial conditions or main inconsistencies.
4. Scope of application
Guarantee of pursing campaign:
- All public guidelines with various parameters
- Multiple control transaction pattern
- Account replacement scenario
- CPI interaction pattern
- Rental fees, edge cases around the calculation limit
Advanced technology and consideration
Different testing as an off chain model
In order to compare with the warm chain implementation, we implement a simplified model of complex mathematical work in high -end language.
This technology is effective in identifying precision errors in the robbery and the same to the Solana program that handles financial calculations.
Fork test adaptation
Solana does not support direct Mainnet forking, such as Ethereum’s Anvil, but developers can replicate certain Mainnet accounts to test environments.
This allows you to test realistic on -chain data while maintaining the safety of the test environment.
Performance and calculation consideration
Solana’s computing budget limit imposes practical constraints on the fuzzy scenario. The design still exerts an important code path while remaining within a realistic transaction calculation restriction.
Consider using Mollusk in a fixed scenario with priority.
Model case and restrictions
To guide you manually by Solana, you need a deep understanding of program logic and Solana’s execution model. This technology is excellent for finding complex interaction bugs, but it depends greatly on defined flow and immutable quality.
Major limitations of MGF:
- Significant manual efforts and expertise are required
- You can miss the vulnerability outside the defined flow scenario
- Performance constraints limit repeated counts of complex scenarios.
Relaxation Strategy:
- Combine the MGF with a wide range of coverage induction for the reference range.
- Based on the new vulnerability research, we regularly update the flow
- Integrate static analysis tools such as static analysis tools X-Ray of SEC3 Comprehensive application
conclusion
Solana’s architecture requires a special security approach. MGF converts tests from hundreds of individual integrated tests to systematic attack vector verification to find vulnerabilities that existing methods miss.
To succeed, you need to understand the unique characteristics of Solana and related attack vectors. Rewards systematically discover subtle vulnerabilities before production.
The security of the Solana ecosystem depends on the pre -test approach to more and more sophisticated protocols. Trident will provide the foundation for building that security to the development workflow from the first day.
Tridents provide a fujing accessibility that all Solana development teams manually guide you. This framework is open source and is designed to develop according to security demands, from the basic fuzzy to the precision test.
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